# Approvals & permissions Source: https://docs.ideharmony.com/concepts/permissions-and-approvals Harmony's safety model is simple to state: **agents propose, you dispose**. Anything that creates new agents or runs dangerous operations passes through a single approval queue in the daemon, and nothing bypasses it unless you explicitly turn the gate off. ## The spawn proposal lifecycle No agent can mint another agent process. Ever. The path is deliberately indirect: 1. An agent or planner calls **`nala_spawn_propose`** with the launch spec. This writes data only; nothing launches. 2. You approve a specific proposal version and hash in the approval queue. 3. **Redeem** is single-use: it returns the launch argv (including YOLO flags when enabled) exactly once. There is no path from "agent wants a helper" to "new agent process" that skips your grant. ## Risk tiers Approvals are risk-rated so the queue stays quiet about boring things and loud about dangerous ones: | Tier | Examples | Default | |---|---|---| | **safe** | Reading state, listing tasks, drafting artifacts | No approval needed | | **review** | Edits, handoffs, messages to other agents | Queued for one-click approval | | **critical** | Spawning agents, dangerous shell operations | Explicit signature required | Shell execution for the Harmony Agent itself runs under permission modes: **supervised** (ask for everything), **auto_edits** (edits flow, the rest asks), **full_access** (no per-action prompts; required before YOLO flags can apply). ## YOLO mode YOLO is the one big red switch, and it is honest about what it does: - One global control in the status bar, never a per-agent switch. - Each provider's YOLO flags inject only when YOLO is on **and** full access is active for that agent. - With YOLO on, agent-to-agent execute requests and spawn proposals **approve automatically**. Harmony never interrupts you. Use it when you trust the room: a well-prompted company on a well-scoped mission, in worktrees you can diff afterwards. Keep it off when the fleet is exploring, because every approval in the queue is a chance to read what the agents are about to do before they do it. ## First-party MCP trust The bundled [MCP server](/docs/customization/mcp) is recognized by name and granted a scoped method allowlist, but this is not a blanket bypass: - Recognized clients (like `claude-code` and the Codex MCP client) may call exactly the RPC methods the bundled server invokes, nothing more. - Methods outside the set fall through to normal enforcement. - An explicit user `denied` always wins. The threat model is best-effort same-user attribution, not a security boundary against same-user code. If a process on your machine is hostile, the approval queue is the last checkpoint, not the first. ## Reading the queue Approvals arrive in the desktop's approval panel and the TUI's permission dialogs. Nothing in the queue executes while it waits, and every decision lands in the activity journal, so "who signed off on that spawn?" is always answerable with `harmony trace` or the trace panel.